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COMMUNITY CONTROL, PUBUC POLICY, AND 
THE LIMITS OF LAW 
David L. Kirp* 
CONCERN about the governance of public education is no longer the exclusive domain of a limited number of professionals and 
a complement of academic critics. Rarely does one pick up a news-
paper without encountering assertions by community groups-gen-
erally poor, black, and organized-of the right to run their own 
schools. Those assertions challenge existing assumptions about the 
proper allocation of power and responsibility and suggest a different 
understanding of what interests in education require formal polit-
ical recognition. Those assertions also reveal conflicts within the 
field of education that have not previously existed or-perhaps more 
accurately-have not previously been noticed. 
The impetus for community control of schools, or school decen-
tralization (the terms have come to be used interchangeably), has 
developed in the past four years, breathtakingly quickly for the 
heretofore placid realm of education.1 The urban community con-
trol movement began in New York City with an experiment spon-
sored by the Ford Foundation and designed to ease tensions in one 
querulous Harlem school district. This first experiment was rapidly 
transformed into a series of state-endorsed district-wide under-
takings, and ultimately into a mandate for restructuring public edu-
cation for the whole of New York City.2 Other cities, including 
• Director, Center for Law and Education, Harvard University; Assistant Professor, 
Harvard Graduate School of Education. A.B. 1965, Amherst College; LL.B. 1968, Har-
vard University.-Ed. 
Derrick Bell, Abram Chayes, Andrew Kaufman, and Frank Michelman of the 
Harvard Law School, and Stephen Arons, Tom Parmenter and Mark Yudof of the 
Center for Law and Education, Harvard University, offered helpful comments on earlier 
drafts of this Article, which was partially financed by a grant from the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity to the Center for Law and Education, Harvard University. I wish 
to express my particular appreciation to David K. Cohen, Associate Professor at the 
Harvard Graduate School of Education, without whose thoughtful and thorough 
criticisms this Article would have been finished months ago. 
I. "Community control" and "decentralization" are used interchangeably throughout 
this Article. A second meaning of "decentralization," namely, the allocation of substan-
tial power to district (rather than city-wide) administrations, is not used. See Fein, Com-
munity Schools and Social Theory: The Limits of Universalism, in COMMUNITY CONTROL 
OF SCHOOLS (H. Levin ed. 1970); Kristo!, Decentralization f OT What?, PUB. !NTEREsT, 
Spring 1968, at 17. 
2. The literature spawned by the New York City dispute is awesome. Pertinent por-
tions are collected in M. BERUBE&: M. GllTELL, CONFRONTATION AT OCEAN HILL-BROWNS-
VILLE (1969); see also M. MAYER, THE TEACHERS' STRIKE, NEW YORK, 1968 (1969). 
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Washington, D.C., Detroit, and Boston, are not far behind New 
York.3 
New York's experience with decentralization has been acrimoni-
ous. That city experienced two extended city-wide strikes by the 
teachers' union, racial tensions distinguished chiefly by the intensity 
of rhetorical invective, union charges that the teachers' right to due 
process of law was being violated, and countercharges by community 
leaders that there had been political sabotage of an educational ex-
periment. While the trauma of the New York situation will prob-
ably not be repeated (New York is a most unreliable political 
weathervane), what Jason Epstein has called "a conflict of opposing 
principles reflecting powerful and apparently irreconcilable class 
interests"4 will recur elsewhere. Struggles are inherent in the very 
notion of community control over leadership and power and the 
resultant control over jobs and finances and curriculum. 
Implicit in arguments over who should run the schools are con-
flicting assumptions concerning what interests demand recognition 
and how power should be allocated. The nominal terms may vary: 
educators speak 0f professionalism; educational researchers focus on 
social-class effects; politicians worry about the availability of dollars. 
But the power dimension, with its inevitable racial overtones, is 
fundamental. By considering the conflict to be one over power, one 
can more easily understand both the protracted and frustrating 
fifteen-year effort to disestablish separate schools in the South and 
the hostility in the North to such presumably beneficial arrange-
ments as integrated metropolitan school districts. Concern about the 
allocation of power illuminates opposition to proposals for com-
munity controlled schools-proposals which would grant "commu-
nities," including racially defined enclaves, real power over teachers, 
curriculum, and dollars. 
That power and race are central to an understanding of the bit-
terness generated by community control indicates that education 
has come to provide a setting for larger unresolved social and polit-
ical problems. The debate about educational policy points up basic 
3. In two states, decentralization has been the subject of considerable controversy. 
In Michigan, decentralization of Detroit's public schools has been opposed by parents 
and state legislators who object to the substantial integration that would result if the 
Detroit school board's plan were adopted. N.Y. Times, April 12, 1970, § I, at 51, col. I. 
In Massachusetts, legislation which would have permitted cities larger than 150,000 to 
decentralize their schools has been sent to committee and proponents are not sanguine 
about its chance of re-emerging. Personal communication from Lawrence Kotin, Mass. 
Law Reform Institute, June 8, 1970. A suit seeking decentralization of Boston's schools 
is currently being pressed. See text accompanying notes 104-06 infra. 
4. Epstein, The Brooklyn Dodgers, NEW YORK R.Evmw OF BooKS, Oct. 10, 1968, in 
M. BERUBE &: M. GITIEL, supra note 2, at 819. 
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and ignored ideological differences that divide interests in our so-
ciety. It embodies what Epstein, speaking of the New York City 
school crisis, termed a "spontaneous and apparently irresistible surge 
of democratic fundamentalism, arising from a revulsion toward 
established social and political institutions."5 It is the consequence 
of what sociologist Robert Nisbet, ·writing some years earlier, diag-
nosed as "the failure of our present democratic and industrial scene 
to create new contexts of association and moral cohesion within 
which the smaller allegiances of men will assume both functional 
and psychological significance."6 
Those concerned about education rightly regard the debate over 
community control as important, whether measured in terms of 
dollars, power over jobs, or power over children's lives. Northern 
black leaders view the debate as an all-or-nothing contest: since the 
joint efforts of blacks and Northern liberals to promote integration 
have failed, blacks have concluded that they can attain "legitimacy" 
only by asserting dominion over their mm community.7 In seeking 
community control, they come into conflict with traditional con-
ceptions of governance and power. They also encounter possible 
constitutional challenges. 
This Article deals with those two points of conflict-disputes 
about governance, race, and political power; and constitutional con-
cerns, rooted in Brown v. Board of Education,8 about racially heter-
ogeneous education. Both are central to understanding, and to giving 
content to, the disagreements about community control. The ques-
tions about power provide a context within which to understand 
the terms of the debate. The constitutional discussion suggests some 
inevitable judicial difficulties in resolving disputes that emerge from 
the debate. Such questions are increasingly before the courts, whose 
decisions may alter the bounds of acceptable conduct in ways that 
permit or deny the legitimacy of new arrangements such as com-
munity control, or for that matter old arrangements such as de facto 
segregation. 
This Article begins with a foray into the social context of the 
control question, noting briefly the competing social philosophies 
that form the basis for discussion. It then examines the constitu-
tional questions, reconsidering the implications of the ambiguous 
5. Id. at 332. 
6. R. NISBET, COllll\lUNITY AND POWER (formerly THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY) 73 
(1962 ed.). 
7. See Hamilton, Race and Education: A Search for Legitimacy, in EQUAL EDUCA-
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY 187 (HARV. Eouc. R.Ev. ed. 1969). 
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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equal-educational-opportunity standard in light of the debate over 
control, and stressing the difficulties that the courts will encounter 
in coping with these matters. 
I. THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEST 
Men journey together with a view to particular advantage, and by 
way of providing some particular thing needed for the purposes of 
life, and similarly the political association seems to have come to-
gether originally, and to continue in existence, for the sake of the 
general advantages it brings.9 
At least since The Federalist Papers articulated a theory of gov-
ernance, most American political philosophy has viewed particular-
istic groups-communities and factions generally-with alarm, and 
has stressed the need to curb the "effects of ~he unsteadiness and 
injustice [with] which a factious spirit tainted our public adminis-
tration" by "break[ing] and control[ling] the violence of faction."10 
The traditional American philosophy has therefore advocated a 
movement of the level of deliberation and the locus of power away 
from the small, and presumably parochial, group to the larger uni-
versal community-toward "secularism, rationality, and univer-
salism and against tradition, ritual, and community."11 If any lesser 
community merited recognition, according to this view, it was only 
the "community of limited liability"12-a self-formed community 
limited in scope and function, created by the volitional acts of in-
dividuals, fluid enough to permit its members to come and go as 
they choose, and yet sufficiently narrowly defined both to permit in-
dividuals to belong to several seemingly inconsistent "communities" 
(a progressive day school for the children, a traditional suburb for 
the family) and to protect those choices. The form of government 
best suited to protecting "universal" interests was, of course, a repre-
sentative republic governing a large area, not a pure democracy for 
a geographically limited region. Even the political pluralists, who 
have recognized the importance of factions in influencing political 
decisions, focused their attention on general issues and advocated 
system-wide, rather than faction-wide or community-wide, resolution 
of those issues.13 
9. ArusroTLE, ETHICS 8. 9. 1160a (M. Ostwald ed. 1962). 
IO. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-78 (E. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). 
11. Fein, supra note 1, at 89. 
12. S. GREER, THE EMERGING CITY! MYTH AND REALITY 107-37 (1962). 
13. See, e.g., R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN .AMERICAN CITY 
(1961). 
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For several reasons, current advocates of community control take 
issue with these conventional political and social assumptions. They 
find them unresponsive to the individual's need to exercise control 
over his own environment. More pertinently, they regard them as 
incompatible with the need of small groups to determine their fate 
collectively. As Robert Nisbet puts the point: 
To create the conditions within which autonomous individuals 
could prosper, could be emancipated from binding ties of kinship, 
class, and community, was the objective of the older laissez faire. To 
create conditions within which autonomous groups may prosper 
must be, I believe, the prime objective of the new laissez faire.14 
Community control advocates regard the traditional philosophical 
assumptions as inconsistent with the American historical record, 
which reveals both a series of de facto grants of power to those who 
already hold power in other political areas and a relegation of the 
less well-situated to the unhelpful care of the state and city. Further-
more, they see in the centralization of power and control an effort 
to exploit--economically, culturally, and politically-the smaller 
communities for the advantage of the larger, rather than any attempt 
at universalistic conflict resolution.15 Milton Kotler has noted that 
[ n Jeighborhood government moves toward territorial public power 
as the basis of creating new social institutions. Furthermore, having 
government authority is more fundamental to changing social con-
ditions than having a vital economic role. 
The strategy of white liberal politics is the opposite; it aims to in-
crease its political power through its economic role.16 
The community control advocates would substitute not the com-
munity of limited liability, with its stress on individual choice, but 
the "diffuse organic community, based as much on mystique as on 
reason, acting as a primary group to its members, speaking a private 
tongue."17 Such a community would be based on "territorial facts 
•.. commonly shared."18 The larger government would intrude only 
14. NISBET, supra note 6, at 278. 
15. There exists economic support for the community control approach: 
••• there is a case for a separate governmental institution for each ghetto, when-
ever group differences in taste for collective goods are important and the patterns of 
segregation in housing are not amenable to change. The collective goods then have 
relatively well-defined boundaries given by the boundaries of the ghetto, and gov-
ernmental institutions which conform to these boundaries are a necessary condition 
for Pareto OJltimal provision of public services. 
Olsen, Strategic Theory and Its Applications, AM. Ee. R.Ev., May 1969, at 479, 484. 
16. M. KOTLER, NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT 92 (1969). 
17. Fein, supra note 1, at 92-93. 
18. Kon.ER, supra note 16, at 64, 65. 
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to provide needed resources. Central to the existence of this kind of 
community is its claim of authority to govern local matters: 
A claim of political authority emanates from lengthy community 
consideration of the many public issues that can cause people dis-
tress, until they realize that local problems are caused by bad laws, 
and can be solved only when the community is empowered to make 
its own laws.19 
Seen in this perspective, the call for community controlled 
schools is but one aspect of a broader set of demands for community 
control over governance.20 These demands pose another set of prob-
lems. Kotler, for example, appears to assume that the state will be 
willing, or at least can be coerced, to provide resources to the com-
munity, while divesting itself of control over those resources-an 
assumption of doubtful political merit. Even more problematic is 
the community control supporters' assumption that there exist sub-
stantial communities capable of agreeing among themselves on pri-
orities and policies. The American black community is not so 
united. It is split both regionally and philosophically between two 
poles of assimilation and control, and this division makes common 
policy difficult to attain. Such divisions indicate the necessity of con-
structing arrangements that will enable communities to make choices 
without destroying the rights of individuals. As Rousseau so mag-
nificently phrased the point, the task is "to find a form of association 
which will defend and protect with the whole common force the 
person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting 
himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free 
as before."21 
This is not the sort of dilemma traditionally put to judicial reso-
lution. It involves basic social choices more typically left to the legis-
lature. But in Brown v. Board of Education,22 the Supreme Court 
formulated a constitutional requirement of equal educational op-
portunity. Inasmuch as certain aspects of community control may 
19. Id. at 73-74. 
20. This tension has its roots in classical sociology, most prominently in Ferdinand 
Tonnies' discussion of Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (usually translated 
a5 society, and describing "a special type of human relationship: one characterized by 
a high degree of individualism, impersonality, contractualism, and proceeding from voli-
tion or sheer interest rather than from the complex of affective states, habits, and 
traditions that underlies Gemeinschaft."). R. NISBEI', THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION 74 
(1966). Chapter three of The Sodological Tradition is the primary source of this 
discussion; it offers a most helpful analysis of "community" in classical sociological 
literature. 
21. J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CoNTRAcr AND DISCOURSFS 13 (G. Cole ed. 1950). 
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
June 1970] Community Control 1361 
be thought to conflict with that requirement, the burden of ap-
praising these basic social issues is thrust upon the courts. The courts 
do not have to determine whether any particular proposal is "good" 
or "bad," but they do have to determine whether it is constitu-
tionally permissible. Unfortunately, one effect of Brown and its 
progeny is that the distinction between those two questions has be-
come blurred, if not entirely erased. As a result, the decision which 
was necessary to protect minority interests may have the unintended 
effect of making impermissible some changes in educational systems 
which would, if permitted, further advance those same minority in-
terests. It is therefore necessary to examine the application of consti-
tutional considerations to the establishment of effective forms of 
community control. 
!I. Is COMMUNITY CONTROL CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE? 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be ex-
pected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa-
tion. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide 
it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.23 
In Brown v. Board of Education the Supreme Court declared 
that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal" and 
deprive Negro children of equal educational opportunities.24 The 
scope of the resulting "equal opportunity" principle remains am-
biguous. Brown may be read in a number of ways, some of which 
cast doubt on the constitutionality of an approach, such as commu-
nity control, which moves away from desegregation by affording 
status and legitimacy to racially defined communities.25 
The narrowest reading of Brown bars only that segregation based 
explicitly on race. Such de jure segregation had been in force in 
the Southern and border states represented by the defendants in 
Brown. But is the ambit of the decision limited to Southern school 
desegregation? Was it the explicitness of Southern segregation or 
the very existence of segregation, in the North or South, that trou-
bled the Court? 
The way in which Brown is interpreted has important implica-
tions for community control. If the Court meant to dismantle those 
23. 347 U.S. at 493. 
24. 347 U.S. at 495. 
25. This discussion assumes that decentralized districts will be relatively homo• 
gcncous in racial and social make-up-an assumption based on the experience of those 
cities in which control has thus far been an issue. Of course, there may be instances in 
which small heterogeneous communities demand the opportunity to run their own 
schools. Such a demand, however, would raise none of these constitutional questions. 
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dual educational systems which had previously existed through force 
of law, other forms of racial isolation-including, presumably, com-
munity control-are not proscribed.26 If, on the other hand, the 
Court felt that racial segregation was constitutionally repugnant 
whether or not mandated by law, Brown makes integration an af-
firmative constitutional requirement. 
While the debate about Brown has most frequently centered on 
whether de facto, as well as de jure, segregation is unconstitutional, 
two other elements of that decision merit attention in considering 
the constitutionality of community control. The segregation con-
demned in Brown was involuntary; the plaintiffs had been given no 
choice but to send their children to an all-black school. By striking 
down this restriction of individual choice, Brown clearly upholds 
the right of free association of individuals against irrational state 
curbs on that right. In that respect, it is less a case concerned with 
education than a pronouncement about general public behavior. If 
the Brown Court's focus on uncoerced association is significant, it 
might enable a court to accept a community control arrangement 
which coupled neighborhood-run schools with a provision permit-
ting children to opt for an integrated education outside the neigh-
borhood.27 
The Supreme Court in Brown also noted the adverse effect of 
segregation on the quality of education afforded black children, sug-
gesting that integration was not regarded as an end valued in itself, 
but as a means of ensuring equal educational outcomes. Such a 
reading of the case leaves extant the possibility that plausible alter-
natives to desegregation as means of promoting equality-such as 
community control-would be acceptable. 
The Brown Court focused on no single element of segregation 
as the basis of its proscription. In Brown the Court appears to have 
posited integration, uncoerced association, and racially equal edu-
cational outcomes as aspects of the same end. Today that assumption 
lacks validity: racial integration by itself will not ensure free associ-
ation or equalize educational outcomes. Moreover, the value of in-
tegration has been called into question by those who renounce 
racially heterogeneous schooling in favor of community control, 
asserting the inadequacy of any other solution. In light of the am-
biguous legal doctrine, and in light of new questions of ideology, it 
26. Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern 
Problem, 58 Nw. U. L. REY. 157 (1963) suggests this interpretation. 
27. It is important to realize that community controlled schools are different in 
kind from the "freedom-of-choice" plans which the Supreme Court rejected in Green 
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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seems appropriate to attempt to identify again the unconstitutional 
aspects of segregation and to re-evaluate the means available for 
remedying these fatal defects. 
The dimensions of the problem vary enormously between the 
North and the South, and even within different communities in each 
region. The complexity of issues, whether viewed as legal conun-
drums or as regional fact patterns susceptible to differing understand-
ings, augurs ill for any effort at unitary solution. In the South, the 
courts continue to strive for an end to the dual system of schooling 
which Brown clearly found unconstitutional.28 The push has been 
slow and costly, both in terms of judicial energy and, more notably, 
in terms of deferred educational promises. Southern school districts 
have shmm considerable and lamentable ingenuity in evading 
Brown. They put forth a :whole host of alternatives-such as massive 
resistance, freedom-of-choice plans, neighborhood schools (where 
neighberhoods were residentially segregated), and tuition-voucher 
schemes-which effectively retained segregation under various 
guises.29 The Snopes-like recurrence of the leading Southern cases-
Griffin v. State Board of Education,30 Poindexter v. Louisiana Fi-
nance Assistance Commission,31 United States v. Jefferson County 
Board of Education,32 Goss v. Board of Education,33 and Brewer v. 
Norfolk School Board34-attests to the extent of the evasion.85 The 
28. There is a vast difference in the history of public education between the South 
and the North. See R. BUTis &: L. CREMIN, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN AME.RICAN CUL-
TURE 250 (1956). The South has never had common schools as such. Almost from the 
first, public schools were racially separate enterprises. In Louisiana, for example, the 
legislature enacted the first public school act in 1847. It provided at least three years 
schooling for "any youth (white, of course) under 21." E. FAY, THE HISTORY OF EDUCA-
TION IN LouISIANA 69 (1898). Despite the Supreme Court's mandate in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537 (1896), that separate facilities had to be "equal," black schools were never 
equal to white schools. Less money was spent for buildings, teachers, and materials in 
black schools; those schools were open fewer days of the year; and they offered more 
limited training. Kirp, The Poor, the Schools, and Equal Protection, in EQUAL EDUCA-
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY 139, 151 (HARV. EDuc. REv. ed. 1969). 
29. See, e.g., Louisiana Fin. Assistance Commn. v. Poindexter, 389 U.S. 571 (1968); 
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ., 390 U.S. 
936 (1968). 
30. 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969). 
31. 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), afjd., 389 U.S. 571 (1968). 
32. 417 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1969). 
33. 373 U.S. 683 (1963). 
34. Brewer v. Norfolk School Bd., 397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1968); remand, Beckett v. 
Norfolk School Bd., 302 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. Va.), rehearing, 308 F. Supp. 1274 (E.D. Va. 
1969). 
35. Cf. Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 849 (5th Cir. 1967). "This 
court has had to deal with a variety of reasons that school boards have managed to 
dredge up to rationailze their denial of the constitutional right of Negro schoolchildren 
to equal educational opportunities with white children. This case presents a new and 
bizarre excuse •••• " Oudge Wisdom). 
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dismantling of the Southern dual educational system will presum• 
ably be hastened by the Supreme Court's recent insistence that 
schools must desegregate "at once."36 The Southern black commu-
nity continues to press for a single system of public schools and an 
end to the vestiges of separate and inferior education. 
In the South, therefore, community control seems both an un-
. likely demand for the black community to make and, at least until 
the dismantling of separate schools has been fully accomplished, of 
doubtful constitutionality.37 The essence of Southern segregation is 
domination: the imposition of a separate system of schools upon the 
black community, against the will of its leaders, unaccompanied by 
any transfer of power or control. Under such a system, choice is a 
chimera, rightly and forcefully condemned by the courts.38 Com-
munity control is a quite different, indeed antithetical, notion. It 
connotes an active choice of dominion over the community's schools 
by a group which defines itself as a community for the purpose of 
making the choice. The concept of community control further 
implies a transfer of significant power to the community in order to 
make meaningful the exercise of control. Advocates of community 
control argue that equal educational opportunity can be achieved 
through means other than integration, that the opportunity for a 
parent to exercise _real and direct influence over his children's edu-
cation-to be able to hold the school accountable for its failures-
carries with it educational benefits.39 It is segregation without choice 
36. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969). 
37. "The [school] board's duty is not discharged until the all-Negro schools in the 
system are done away with •••• " United States v. Choctaw County Bd. of Educ., 417 
F.2d 838, 839 (5th Cir. 1969). 
38. See, e.g., Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 686 (1963). "The right of transfer 
••• is a one way ticket leading to but one destination, i.e., the majority race of the 
transferee and continued segregation." See also Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 
430 (1968); Goss v. Board of Educ., 406 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1969); Walker v. County 
School Bd., 413 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1969); Davis v. Board of School Commrs., 414 F.2d 
609 (5th Cir. 1969); Jackson v. Marvell School Dist., 416 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1969); United 
States v. Lovett, 416 F.2d 801, 807 (5th Cir. 1969) ("state-imposed segregation of the 
races") (emphasis added); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 417 F.2d 834 
(5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Choctaw County Bd. of Educ., 417 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 
1969); United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 417 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1969). 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), is the clearest example of this imposition, 
in a somewhat broader context. In Gomillion, the state legislature detached the pre-
dominantly black section of a city from the rest of the city and created a separate com-
munity, which had to provide its own public services. The Court overturned the 
separation, noting that 
the essential inevitable effect of this redefinition of Tuskegee's boundaries is to 
remove from the city all save only four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not 
removing a single white voter or resident. The result of this Act is to deprive the 
Negro petitioners discriminatorily of the benefits of residence in Tuskegee, in-
cluding inter alia, the right to vote in municipal elections. 
364 U.S. at 341. 
39. Hamilton, Race and Education: A. Search for Legitimacy, 38 HARv. Eouc. REv. 
669, 681-84 (1968). 
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or control that Southern schoolmen have proffered and black leaders 
oppose, and the Southern black community has thus far been disin-
clined to propose the very different separation implicit in commu-
nity control. Moreover, in order to eliminate state-imposed segrega-
tion, federal courts in the South have found it necessary to strike 
down all proposed alternatives to desegregation that would have 
operated to maintain the status quo.40 Until the vestiges of the dual 
school system are abandoned, courts are unlikely to embrace com-
munity control where communities are racially and socially de-
fined. 41 
In the North, on the other hand, black leaders have come to 
regard community control of schools as the most promising means of 
securing educational equality.42 Certain of the educational ends 
that they seek are similar to those sought by the integrationists: 
schools that can succeed in teaching basic cognitive skills, such as 
reading and ciphering, to poor and black school children; schools 
that can prepare children to cope with life in a. complex and too 
often hostile environment. Community control advocates argue 
either that integration has not worked, or, more typically, that the 
political will to attempt it has been lacking.43 As a result, they con-
tend, continuing reliance on integration as a means for achieving 
the desired educational ends no longer seems appropriate.44 Rather, 
in their view, control, and the educational, psychological, and polit-
ical benefits that assertedly follow from such control, is a preferable 
means. 
Judicial insistence that Southern schools integrate "at once,"45 
coupled with the increasing willingness of Northern courts to iden-
tify racially motivated practices of city school boards as illegiti-
mate,46 makes evident the potential conflict between community 
control in the North and the Brown rule. The conflict may be 
simply put: decentralization promotes racial isolation; Brown in-
veighs against it. If Brown is read to disallow all racial separation, 
community control will be found to be unconstitutional; and no 
40. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v. 
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Louisiana Fin. Assistance Commn. v. Poin-
dexter, 389 U.S. 571 (1968). 
41. Cf. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 
78 HARv. L. REv. 564, 610 (1965): where a community is " .•. politically impotent or 
deliberately excluded from the political process ••• the appeal inherent in a negotiated 
resolution of competing interests is lacking .••. " 
42. Hamilton, supra note 39, at 670-76. 
43. See Cohen, The Price of Community Control, COMMENTARY, July 1969, at 23. 
44. Id. 
45. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969). 
46. See text accompanying notes 71-80 infra. 
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expression favoring separateness, even if made by the majority of a 
black community, will be able to cure the constitutional defect.47 
Yet that reading of Brown seems overly mechanical and is pecu-
liarly unresponsive to different factual contexts and to the educa-
tional consequences of alternative arrangements.48 It also fuses two 
elements of the decision that merit separate analysis: Brown's con-
cern with educational consequences, and its concern with associa-
tional consequences. 
In Brown the Court explicitly framed its ruling in terms of edu-
cational outcomes, citing the effect of segregated schooling on black 
children.49 This effect presumably would have existed whether segre-
gation had come about adventitiously or through force of law. In the 
intervening fifteen years, the educational evidence has changed.ISO 
Furthermore, Northern federal courts have generally been un-
willing to cast the rights of black school children in substantive edu-
cational terms.51 
The Brown Court apparently assumed that racial isolation causes 
racially different outcomes and that racial integration will yield 
racially identical results. Current social-science evidence drastically 
qualifies that assumption. It suggests that race has only a modest 
effect on schooling success and that social-class integration is more 
47. This is analogous to the position that the Supreme Court has taken with 
respect to the "one man-one vote" constitutional standard. In a case arising from 
Colorado, the Court concluded that the electorate's approval of a legislative-apportion-
ment plan which varied from the "one man-one vote" standard was irrelevant in deter-
mining the plan's constitutionality once a dissident minority had challenged that plan. 
An individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted vote 
cannot be denied even by a vote of a majority of a state's electorate, if the appor-
tionment scheme adopted by the voters fails to measure up to the requirements of 
the Equal Protection Clause •.•• A citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be 
infringed simply because a majority of people choose that it be. 
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964). The case is partic-
ularly interesting because a majority of voters in every county in the state approved 
the challenged apportionment scheme. 
48. Cf. Fiss, supra note 41, at 608, 
49. Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental 
effect upon the colored children. • • • A sense of inferiority affects the motivation 
of the child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of the law, therefore, has a 
tendency to retard the educational and mental development of Negro children and 
to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated 
school system. Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at 
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. 
347 U.S. at 494. 
50. See, e.g., UNITED STATES CoMMN. ON CIVIL RlGHI'S, RACIAL lsOLATION IN THE 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967); EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (HARV. Enuc. R.Ev. ed. 1969). 
51. The rejection of the justiciability of the "educational-needs" concept is the 
clearest example of this judicial unwillingness. See McGinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 
327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), afjd. sub nom., McGinnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Burrus v. 
Wilkerson, 801 F. Supp. 1237 (W.D. Va. 1969), afjd., 397 U.S. 44 (1970). 
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likely than is racial integration to lead to significant educational 
benefits for poor and black school children.52 Even more important, 
the limitations of the evidence from social science are also more 
plain today. The research commends no single strategy as likely to 
produce educational equality, no strategy likely to overcome the 
nonschool differentials that find their way into outcomes measured 
by reading and arithmetic comprehension tests. In short, equality 
of educational outcomes-the most significant measure of oppor-
tunity to the children primarily affected-appears unattainable by 
any single pattern of educational intervention. There are a variety 
of alternative educational approaches. These include compensatory-
education programs, such as those established by title I of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 53 which would provide 
added educational resources to disadvantaged children; the establish-
ment of metropolitan school districts, which would foster race and 
class heterogeneity; and the use of tuition vouchers, which would 
promote educational choice by permitting students to enroll in pri-
vate or public schools.54 The effectiveness of such programs remains 
for the most part undetermined. 
In the face of such an educational dilemma, the Court would be 
unwise to equate equality of educational opportunity-the constitu-
tional standard-with equality of educational outcome; exhortations 
to do the impossible do not make good law.55 For the community 
control advocate, this seems fortunate, since the evidence suggesting 
the educational efficacy of community control is slim indeed.56 
While there is substantial rhetoric to the contrary, little data exists 
which indicates that community control alone, without substantial 
infusions of dollars and resources, would significantly change educa-
tional outcomes. The notion of community control is at its heart a 
political statement, equally appropriate in the context of police or 
fire protection. But that often camouflaged fact should not in itself 
make community control any less acceptable to the courts; few con-
trary educational assertions carry much empirical weight. 
52. See, e.g., U.S. NATL. CENTER FOR EDuc. STATisncs, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL 
OPPORTUNITY a. Coleman ed. 1966); EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY {HARV, Eouc. 
REv. ed. 1969). 
53. 20 U.S.C. §§ 241 a-m (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
54. See Jencks, ls the Public School Obsolete?, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1966, 
at 23-24. 
55. Cf. Lon Fuller's discussion of the "morality of aspiration" in THE :MORALITY oF 
LAw 5 (1964). 
56. See Pettigrew, Race and Equal Educational Opportunity, in EQUAL EDUCA-
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY 69 {HARV. EDuc. REv. ed. 1969); Cohen, The Price of Community 
Control, COMMENTARY, July 1969, at 2!!. 
1368 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:1355 
Northern federal courts have dealt with school segregation in 
different ways. During the 1960's, they were generally unwilling to 
order school boards to overcome harm assertedly caused by adven-
titious de facto segregation. 57 While one federal district court de-
clared that "there must be no segregated schools,"58 three federal 
courts of appeal read Brown as prohibiting only de jure school segre-
gation. 59 In so doing, the courts focused not on the educational con-
sequences of segregation, but rather on its associational conse-
quences. 
In Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education,60 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit provided the clearest expli-
cation of this position. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that 
they were constitutionally entitled to a remedy for the educational 
harm done to black children by requiring them, through adherence 
to a neighborhood school policy, to attend predominantly black 
schools. It viewed the wrong addressed in Brown not in terms of edu-
cational damage, but as an arbitrary racial classification proscribed 
by the equal protection clause: 
The essence of the Brown decision was that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not allow the state to classify its citizens differently solely 
because of their race. While the detrimental impact of compulsory 
segregation on the children of the minority race was referred to by 
57. Paradoxically, the factual basis for finding discriminatory intent seems strongest 
in Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), affd., 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 
1963), cert. denied, 877 U.S. 924 (1964), the leading case rejecting the principle that de 
facto segregation is unconstitutional. In Gary, schools had been formally segregated, as 
authorized by Indiana state law, until 1948. In 1953, the school board explained that a 
school boundary which created an all-black school had been adopted because "it is not 
considered good for children of a closely knit community, such as the [overwhelmingly 
black] Project, to attend different schools." 213 F. Supp. at 823-24. Other decisions by 
the board concerning districting and school construction suggest similar racial motiva• 
tion. See Kaplan, Segregation, Litigation and the Schools-Part III: The Gary Litigation, 
59 Nw. U. L. REV. 121 (1965). 
In contrast, Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed 
as premature, 288 F.2d 600 (2d Cir.), remedy considered on rehearing, 195 F. Supp. 231 
(S.D.N.Y.), affd., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961), found and pro• 
scribed de jure segregation on far slimmer factual grounds: hearsay evidence that dis-
trict lines had been gerrymandered in 1930, and a policy-terminated in 1949-of per-
mitting whites to transfer out of a predominantly black school. 
58. Barksdale v. School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543, 547 (Mass.), revd. on other 
grounds, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965). See also Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 
208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); 
Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 875, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 
(1963) (dictum). 
59. See, e.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 244 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Ohio), affd., 369 
F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849 (1967); Bell v. School City of Gary, 
213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), affd., 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 
924 (1964); Downs v. Kansas City, 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 
914 (1965). 
60. 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966). 
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the Court, it was not indispensable to the decision. Rather, the 
Court held that segregation of the races was an arbitrary exercise 
of governmental power inconsistent with the requirements of the 
Constitution. 61 
The Deal court regarded choice, unconstrained by "irrelevant bar-
riers,"62 as crucial to the Supreme Court's holding in Brown: "The 
element of inequality in Brown was the unnecessary restriction of 
freedom of choice for the individual based on the fortuitous, un-
controllable, arbitrary factor of his race."63 
Unconstrained freedom of association is, at first blush, an ar-
restingly attractive judicial concept. It falls within the ambit of tradi-
tional equal protection decisions;64 and it removes the court from 
the troublesome business of reviewing discretionary acts, such as 
adherence to a neighborhood school policy, for which some educa-
tional justification can be shmvn. Indeed, it is "choice" that com-
munity control advocates favor in arguing that certain self-defined 
communities have a right to manage their own educational affairs. 
Yet where the self-selected community is predominately black 
(or Puerto Rican or Mexican-American), the exercise of choice may 
yield constitutionally troubling consequences. The clear teaching of 
Green v. County School Board65 is that a politically dominant white 
community cannot opt for a nominally free-choice arrangement 
which in fact excludes black students from formerly all-white 
schools.66 Does community control, insofar as it promotes racially 
identifiable communities, fall within the category of discriminatory 
association condemned by Brown and Green? The question is more 
sharply posed in the context of a hypothetical lawsuit, brought by a 
black parent, challenging a community control arrangement on the 
grounds that the effect of such an arrangement is to deny his chil-
dren the opportunity to associate with white school children. If the 
community is indeed racially defined, and if the arrangement offers 
the parent no option but to send his child to the neighborhood 
(and black) school, the parent's argument is appealing: his children 
do not have the chance to go to school with white children; and 
61. 369 F.2d at 58-59 (emphasis added). 
62. 369 F .2d at 59. 
63. 369 F.2d at 60. 
64. See, e.g., Tussman &: tenBrook, Equal Protection of the Law, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 
341 (1949). 
65. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
66. "Implicit in Brown's condemnation of governmentally imposed segregation is 
the judgment that the satisfaction of discriminatory associational desires is not a legiti-
mate government function where the result is segregated education." Fiss, supra note 
41, at 575 n.7. 
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the source of that denial is the official policy of the school board, 
not just the happenstance of residence. 
Certainly, there are differences between the rationale that 
prompts community control and the rationale for other forms of 
segregated schooling. But the effect is the same-state-promoted 
racial isolation. The remedy in such a situation, however, is not 
necessarily that community control be struck down in its entirety. 
If unconstrained choice is the value to be conserved, the parent's 
concern extends only to his children and to the class of children in 
the community who are prevented by the community control plan 
from attending integrated schools. If the arrangement were struc-
tured in such a manner as to attend, at public expense, a school 
in which his race is a minority, this constraint on choice would be 
removed. The arrangement might then, and only then, be constitu-
tionally acceptable.67 The constitutional question has not, however, 
been posed to the courts in this form. Decisions striking down 
freedom-of-choice plans in the South assumed, quite rightly, that 
freedom of choice in that context was but a subterfuge to avoid dis-
establishing the dual educational system. Yet where such a system 
has not previously existed (and Deal,68 Bell,69 and Downs10 all sug-
gest that this is the conventional judicial understanding of many 
Northern school situations), freedom of choice for the integration-
minded, predicated on the wishes of the black community, might 
well be permissible. 
But discussions of constitutional possibility do not foreclose 
the educational problems. Coupling community control with a 
"majority-to-minority transfer" provision places the burden of choos-
ing an integrated education on the parent, rather than on the state; 
in so doing it implies that communitarianism is to be regarded as 
the norm and integration as the exception. Furthermore, it subjects 
the parent who prefers an integrated education for his children to 
considerable community pressure. Whether the burden and the 
pressure ought to rest with the integration-minded parent is a 
dilemma not easily resolved. 
These problems have become even more important in light of 
67. The "majority-to-minority transfer" provision has in fact been adopted by 
numerous Southern school boards which are under desegregation orders. See, e.g., 
Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970). 
68. 244 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Ohio), affd., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 
389 U.S. 849 (1967). 
69. 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), affd., 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 
U.S. 924 (1964). 
70. 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965). 
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recent litigation concerning segregation in the North.71 These cases 
reject the presumption that Northern school segregation is the 
result of factors outside the control of the school board. They indi-
cate a willingness on the part of the courts to examine the intent 
of local school boards and to identify and to proscribe deliberate 
segregation resulting from district line drawing, busing, construc-
tion, and teacher and student assignment practices. The facts of 
United States v. School District 151 of Cook County clearly support 
a finding of intentional segregation.72 White students were bused 
long distances, past predominantly black schools, in order to enable 
them to attend all-white schools; black students were denied similar 
opportunities. In addition, school construction was planned to main-
tain an all-Negro school, and no black teachers were assigned to the 
predominantly white schools until 1967. The district, in short, 
maintained segregated schools as completely and as purposefully as 
did many Southern school districts. In such a situation, no remedy 
short of disestablishment would have been appropriate. Further-
more, in two very recent cases, Davis v. School District of the City 
of Pontiac73 and Crawford v. Board of Education,74 segregation in 
Pontiac, Michigan, and in Los Angeles, California, was declared un-
constitutional without the clear showing of discriminatory intent 
which was made in the Cook County decision. The school boards in 
both cases had maintained a neighborhood school policy which as-
sertedly took into consideration only proximity and safety factors in 
setting attendance zones and in building new schools. But such a 
policy, the Davis court suggested, did not absolve the board of re-
sponsibility for the segregation that resulted. Intent, the court said, 
is to be inferred when the local school board has unnecessarily 
perpetuated a segregated system: 
This Court finds that the Pontiac Board of Education intention-
ally utilized the power at their [sic] disposal to locate new schools 
and arrange boundaries in such a way as to perpetuate the pattern 
of segregation within the City and, thereby, deliberately, in contra-
diction of their announced policies of achieving a racial mixture 
in the schools, prevented integration. Where the power to act is 
71. See, e.g., United States v. School Dist. 151 of Cook County, 404 F.2d 1125 {7th Cir. 
1969); Davis v. School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970) {Pontiac); Crawford v. 
Board of Educ., Civil No. 822854 {Los Angeles Super. Ct., May 18, 1970); :Berry v. 
School Dist., Civil No. 9 (W.D. Mich., Feb. 17, 1970) {:Benton Harbor, Michigan); Keyes 
v. School Dist., Civil No. C-1499 (D. Colo., May 21, 1970) (Denver). See also Taylor v. 
Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961). 
72. 404 F.2d 1125 {7th Cir. 1969). 
73. 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970). 
74. Civil No. 822854 {Los Angeles Super. Ct., May 18, 1970) (unpub. opinion). 
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available, failure to take the necessary steps so as to negate or alle-
viate a situation which is harmful is as ·wrong as is the taking of 
affirmative steps to advance that situation. . . . Where a Board of 
Education has contributed and played a major role in the develop• 
ment and growth of a segregated situation, the Board is guilty of 
de jure segregation.15 
These decisions suggest that many heretofore unchallenged 
school board policies will be unacceptable where those policies serve 
to promote or to perpetuate racially isolated schools. They do not, 
however, establish a judicial policy concerning community control. 
The distinction between control and the proscribed policies is signi-
ficant: where city boards have adjusted boundaries or assigned 
teachers, with racially predictable consequences, they have done so 
without the consent of the communities primarily affected; further-
more, no transfer of power has accompanied the provision of racially 
differentiated services. That distinction should permit a court to 
uphold a community control scheme while refusing to sanction 
racially motivated actions undertaken by a city-wide school board. 
It is here that the rationales underlying the Davis and Crawford 
decisions diverge. While both cases proscribed segregated schooling, 
Davis based that conclusion on a finding of intentional de jure 
segregation. The Davis court was careful to acknowledge "that a 
Board of Education has no affirmative duty to eliminate segregation 
when it has done nothing to create it. . . ."76 The court found, 
however, that the Pontiac Board had in fact "created" segregation 
through an ostensibly color-blind neighborhood school policy. The 
court in Crawford was much more outspoken in its belief in in-
tegrated education for all schoolchildren. Although the court found 
that there was intentional segregation in Los Angeles, it dismissed 
the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, concluding 
that the harm done to black children was the same in both cases, 
and that the school board's duty to provide integrated education 
was an affirmative constitutional obligation. The court stated: 
75. 309 F. Supp. at 741-42. Cf. Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150, 153 
(E.D.N.Y. 1962): 
Education is compulsory in New York ... ; those for whom education is compulsory 
by reason of theu- age are unqualifiedly entitled to attend the public schools of 
their residence ..• ; ••. taxation for support of the schools is mandatory •••• 
The educational system that is thus compulsory and publicly afforded must deal 
·with the inadequacy arising from adventitious segregation; it cannot accept any 
indurate segregation on the ground that it is not coerced or planned but accepted. 
In Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208, remedy considered on rehearing, 
229 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), the court rejected the argument that the Negro 
plaintiffs have "chosen" segregation by volunteering to live in one neighborhood, noting 
the obvious economic disparity between Negro and white neighborhoods. 
76. 309 F. Supp. at 742. 
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Segregation of children in public schools deprives the children of 
the minority group of equal educational opportunities and this ir-
respective of whether the segregation be described or classified as 
de facto or de jure. -
The labelling of segregation as de jure or de facto does not change 
the fact of segregation. Each is merely a legal designation, a legal 
handle in the formulation of duties. The duty to grant and give 
all students, including the minority students, equal educational op-
portunity, is affirmative, the counterpart of depriving by prohibit-
ing. 
It is practically impossible, in the creation and maintenance of 
neighborhood schools, and the mandating of attendance thereat, 
which are in fact segregated, said schools being created and main-
tained by tax money, to have only de facto segregation.77 
The Crawford opinion makes explicit its reliance on psychological 
evidence which demonstrates the benefit of integrated education 
for all schoolchildren; it concludes that segregation impairs the 
confidence of black and Mexican-American children and restricts 
their aspirations.78 In this instance, the court's argument rests on 
shaky educational grounds: it is far from clear that racially isolated 
schools cannot develop the same self-assurance and the same sense of 
control over one's own destiny that are promoted by nominally 
integrated schools.79 It is not even clear that integration promotes 
such a sense of control. Crawford has in effect adopted a social 
policy: that the aim of schools is to acculturate all children-to 
assimilate them into "the mainstream of American society."80 That 
policy does not enjoy universal acceptance, either by the white 
77. Crawford v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 822854 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., May 18, 
1970) at 26, 85-86 (unpub. opinion). 
78. Negro and Mexican children suffer serious harm when their education takes 
place in public schools which are racially segregated, whatever the source of such 
segregation might be. Negro and Mexican children who attend predominantly 
Negro or Mexican schools do not achieve as well as other children-Negro, Mexi-
can and 'White in integrated schools. Their aspirations become more restricted than 
t11ose of other children. They do not have as much confidence that they can influ-
ence their own futures. When they become adults they are less likely to participate 
in the mainstream of Anlerican society, and more likely to fear, dislike and avoid 
white Americans. It "affects their hearts and minds in ways unlikely ever to be 
undone." ••• The harm results not alone from the deprival of equal educational 
opportunity, but additionally in the attitudes which such segregation generates 
and the effect of those attitudes upon motivation to learn and achieve. 
Crawford v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 822854 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., May 18, 1970) 
at 2!!-24 (unpub. opinion). 
79. Many ostensibly integrated schools continue to group students by track or tested 
ability, thereby effectively isolating black students from the rest of the school. Such 
tracking recreates segregation and raises constitutional problems which are beyond the 
scope of this Article. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), afld. sub 
nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1969). 
80. Crawford v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 822854 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., May 18, 
1970) at 23 (unpub. opinion). 
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community or by the minority communities that will supposedly 
benefit from the Crawford decision. It has little to do with educa-
tional consequences but much to do with social intermeddling, and 
for that reason it seems unfortunate. To require full integration 
as the only constitutionally acceptable system of education is both 
unrealistic and unwise. It would make substantially more sense for 
courts to adopt the rationale of the Cook County and Davis cases, 
employing the concept of intentional de jure segregation to strike 
down school board policies which impose racially segregated schools 
on nonconsenting individuals, without barring such alternative ap-
proaches to equal educational opportunity as community control. 
Prediction is difficult in an area of the law as complex as equality 
of educational opportunity. It does, however, seem urJikely that 
the Supreme Court, when finally faced with the question, will con-
clude that integration is an affirmative constitutional right for all 
children. The factual situations are too diverse, the competing ends 
-notably, racially and socially heterogeneous schooling versus 
the maintenance of the unhampered right of association-too irre-
solvable to warrant such a mechanical solution. Thus, while Northern 
as well as Southern school boards may find themselves increasingly 
unable to maintain racially separated schools through an assort-
ment of "neutral" building practices, attendance zoning, or teacher 
assignment practices, substantial community control-with com-
munity consent and the transfer of power over education-should 
be deemed constitutionally permissible. 
!II. Is COMMUNITY CONTROL CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED? 
Those unsatisfied with the responses of state and city officials 
to appeals for decentralized schools have lately taken their case to 
the courts and have asserted a constitutional right to community 
controlled schools. In the midst of New York's school crisis, one 
community group in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville section of New 
York City claimed the right to determine the experimental school 
district's policies and to hire and fire teachers and principals.81 
In Boston, several black plaintiffs demanded that the city school 
board be elected by area, rather than on a city-wide basis, in order 
to ensure the election of at least one black school board member 
to the five-member board; as an alternative remedy, the plaintiffs 
proposed the division of the city into self-governing districts.82 While 
81. Oliver v. Donovan, 293 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). 
82. Owens v. School Comm., 304 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mass. 1969). 
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these cases are nominally couched in constitutional terms, they 
actually represent unresolved political disagreements over who should 
control the schools. Community control advocates have thus far been 
unsuccessful in obtaining judicial relief. Courts, without legislative 
guidance, have refused to become too deeply involved in the struggle 
over the power to determine educational policy. 
Those who would make community control a constitutional 
right develop two quite different arguments. The first, relied on in 
the New York litigation, insists that only through control can equal 
educational opportunity be achieved, since any other form of school 
governance inevitably disadvantages poor and black children.88 The 
second, the basis of the Boston litigation, draws on the reapportion-
ment decisions84 to establish for groups of like-minded individuals 
the general right to manage their own political affairs and the 
specific right to manage their mvn schools.85 
The argument equating decentralization with equal opportunity 
for poor and black children reflects the disillusionment of the black 
community with earlier efforts at securing quality education, notably 
through busing black children to white schools and developing 
"magnet schools" to draw children from all parts of the city. For a 
variety of reasons, the most significant of which were minimal finan-
cial support and insufficient political force, those measures proved 
less than adequate to meet the needs of the affected communities.86 
On the basis of that particular educational and political failure, 
plaintiffs in the New York case, Oliver v. Donovan,81 asserted that 
any educational effort managed by the city-wide board would in-
evitably harm poor and black urban school children. In a subse-
quent suit, arguing for the right of the experimental school districts 
to survive a city-wide redistricting, New York community groups 
presented the view that 
[a]s a result of the past history of educational deprivation out of 
which the demonstration projects grew, the immediate design of 
this present plan to eliminate the demonstration projects [ described 
elsewhere in the complaint as "an attempt by the governmental 
agencies of the state to return members of the nonwhite communities 
83. I.S. 201 Complex Demonstration Project Governing Bd. v. Board of Educ., Civil 
No. 69C-5919 (S.D.N.Y., May 4, 1970) (unreported). 
84. See, e.g., Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Ind. 1969), prob. juris. 
noted, 397 U.S. 984 (1970). See discussion in text accompanying notes 105-14 infra. 
85. Owens v. School Comm., 304 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mass. 1969). 
86. See Count 1 in the Complaint, I.S. 201 Complex Demonstration Project Gov-
erning Bd. v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 69C-5919 (S.D.N.Y., May 4, 1970) (unreported). 
87. 293 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Plaintiffs in Oliver included the governing 
boards of two of the city's three experimental community controlled districts. 
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to a status inferior to that of white communities; i.e. 'to keep them 
in their place,' in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment."] and 
the ultimate effect of this plan £or the educational future of the non-
white communities involved, the state's attempted withdrawal of 
the community-controlled education experiments, and the education 
benefits and experimental value inherent in those projects, vio-
lates the constitutional mandates of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 88 
The argument is couched in terms of equal protection: when a 
right is "fundamental" (and it is asserted that education is such a 
right), state action which discriminates even unintentionally against 
one group of citizens is unconstitutional unless that action is the 
only way of furthering a legitimate state interest. School governance 
is an example of this situation, since a city-wide school board, by 
attempting to treat all children in the same fashion, benefits only 
its middle-class constituency. Such differential consequences are 
viewed as an inevitable concomitant of city-wide educational 
governance. Furthermore, such centralized governance does not ap-
pear to further even such an arguably legitimate state concern as 
socialization. The argument concludes that decentralization is the 
only constitutional way to manage city schools, because only decen-
tralization promotes more responsive and more effective urban ed-
ucation.89 
This analysis may be considered an attempt to clothe in consti-
tutional garb the policy notion that communities have an inherent 
right to govern themselves. That position has undoubted political 
appeal. It also finds some support in the historical record, at least 
prior to the mid-nineteenth century. While Massachusetts recognized 
as early as 1642 that "the great neglect of many parents and masters 
in training their children in learning and labor, and other imply-
ments which may be proffitable to the common wealth ... "00 called 
for colonial intervention, that intervention was, for almost two 
hundred years, limited to statutes encouraging the local community 
to provide some form of education.91 No guidelines were established; 
88. Amended Complaint at 14, I.S. 201 Complex Demonstration Project Governing 
Bd. v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 69C-5919 (S.D.N.Y., May 4, 1970) (unreported) 
(emphasis added). 
89. See Note, School Decentralization: Legal Paths to Local Control, 57 GEO. L.J. 992 
(1969). 
90. Mass. School of Law of 1642, in H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 
28 (7th ed. 1968). 
91. Of course, the pattern of state responsibility differed from state to state. New 
York was one of the first states to recognize the virtues of centralized public education. 
The Southern states did not, for the most part, require public education until after the 
Civil War. Few, if any, states provided substantial financial support for public schools. 
See generally L. CREMIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOLS: AN HISTORIC CONCEPTION 
91-125 (1951); B. BAILYN, EDUCATION lN THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1960). 
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no requirements were set; and no aid was provided. The community 
provided the initiative, determined who would attend school, chose 
those who would teach in the schools; and decided what would be 
taught. The ratification of the Federal Constitution did not alter 
the pattern: none of the original thirteen states provided for educa-
tion in their state constitutions. Indeed, by 1820 only thirteen of 
the then twenty-three states made constitutional reference to educa-
tion. 02 A decade later a Massachusetts educator, distinguishing 
between public and private schools, noted that public schools "are 
under the supervision of selected men, responsible more or less 
directly to the community. The private schools have no supervision, 
or only that of the parents.''93 Nothing in the debates of that time 
indicates a much different role for the states. Indeed, it was not until 
the middle of the nineteenth century that states established state-
wide boards of education and appointed state superintendents of 
education, thereby making clear their concern with the efficiency 
and quality of public schools.94 
This historical evidence belies the notion that the state's exer-
cise of dominion over education is both inevitable and irresistibly 
correct. Yet, although the political and historical record is appeal-
ing, it makes a far from compelling legal argument. Courts have long 
held that communities have no inherent legal right to "control" 
their schools.95 In legal theory, at least, the state proposes and dis-
poses with respect to public education, while local school districts 
carry out the state's wishes.96 
Well before community control of schools became a common 
demand of Northern black communities, other groups resented the 
checks placed on local authority by distant and seemingly unrespon-
sive state legislatures. They asserted that education was of primary 
concern to the community, not to the state, and should therefore 
be controlled by the community. Courts have consistently rejected 
such assertions. As the Indiana supreme court stated in an often-
cited case: 
Essentially and intrinsically the schools in which are educated and 
trained the children who are to become the rulers of the common-
92, COUNCIL OF CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS, EDUCATION IN THE STATES: NATIONWIDE 
DEVELOPMENT 135 a. Pearson &: E. Fuller eds. 1969). 
93, L, CREMIN, THE .AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOLS: AN HISTORIC CONCEPTION 137 
(1951). 
94. EDUCATION IN THE STATES, supra note 92, at 75. 
95. The cases are collected in E. BOLMIER, THE SCHOOL IN THE LEGAL STRUcrURE 
(1968) and R. HAMILTON&: P. MORT, THE LAw AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1959). 
96. Constitutions in every state except Connecticut require that the state maintain 
free public schools; the Connecticut Constitution otherwise provides funds for public 
schools. E. BoLMIER, supra note 95, at 65-67. 
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wealth are matters of State, and not local jurisdiction. In such mat-
ters, the State is the unit, and the legislature the source of power. 
The authority over schools . . . is a central power residing in the 
Legislature of the State. It is for the law-making to determine whether 
the authority shall be exercised by a State board of education, or 
distributed to county, township, or city organization throughout the 
state .... 97 
The "inherent right" argument relies more heavily on the as-
serted rights of certain groups than it does on the concerns of local 
governmental units. Proponents of community control have focused 
on black communities and have contended that, at least for black 
people, control is a prerequisite to educational equality. They indict 
the schools for failing to reach whole segments of the population, 
for imprisoning rather than instructing school children,08 and for 
creating a permanent underclass, unaware of its potential and doomed 
to repeat the careers of its fathers. The increasing number of school 
drop-outs is no longer thought to represent personal failure or 
social-class differences, but rather is considered symptomatic of the 
systemic breakdmvn of the public schools. Advocates of community 
control argue that, in light of such a breakdown, they can do no 
worse in running the schools. Indeed, they believe that they will be 
able to do far better because of their more intimate knowledge of the 
community's children and the problems which those children face. 
A further level of argument deals with the failure of existing 
school systems to impart to children a sense of control over their 
own destinies. This argument derives empirical support from Equal-
ity of Educational Opportunity/19 a massive report on American 
public education. The survey that was the basis for that report in-
cluded several questions designed to measure "fate control"-the 
degree to which children feel that their own efforts, rather than fate, 
determine the course of their lives. The responses indicated a strik-
. ing correlation between an individual's sense of fate control and his 
performance in school. Supporters of community control have relied 
on this finding. They argue that community controlled schools will 
give black students a sense that they can reconquer their surrendered 
identity, and that this sense will in turn enable those students to 
97. State v. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 465, 23 N.E. 946, 947 (1890). For more recent 
development of this point, see Fruit v. Metropolitan School Dist., 241 Ind. 621, 172 
N.E.2d 864 (1961); Fort Wayne Community Schools v. State, 240 Ind. 57, 159 N.E.2d 708 
(1959). 
98. Death at an Early Age, the title of Jonathan Kozol's book, suggests a metaphor 
more ominous than imprisonment. 
99. U.S. NATL. CENTER FOR Enuc. STATISTICS, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTU-
NITY G· Coleman ed. 1966). 
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succeed more regularly in what was formerly viewed as a hostile 
and ego-defeating school environment.100 
To argue that the failure of the present educational system makes 
decentralization a constitutional requirement is to over-simplify a 
vexing educational problem. While the argument obtains support 
from commonly held misgivings about urban schooling, it proposes 
as the only acceptable remedy what is in fact only one of several 
alternative and competing choices. The consequences of each com-
peting choice are not altogether clear. Even after numerous academic 
skirmishes, no one really knows what pedagogic consequences will 
follow from altering the method of school governance. Nor is it 
self-evident that slackness in the central school administration bears 
on or causes disasters in the classroom. Perhaps it does; but that 
conclusion depends on speculations about human nature and politi-
cal behavior, speculations not usually accorded constitutional recog-
nition. 
Other strategies for securing equal educational opportunity have 
recently been proposed. State educational financing schemes have 
been attacked on constitutional grounds in an attempt to prevent 
states from making school support a function of community wealth, 
and these attacks promise added dollars to presently impoverished 
urban school systems. Two proposed remedies-district power equal-
izing and family power equalizing-would eliminate the effect of 
wealth variations, while stressing the importance of local choice and 
fiscal control.101 Power equalizing makes the quality of educational 
services a function of effort-the result of how heavily the relevant 
unit, whether district or family, chooses to tax itself for education. 
It would enable any school district to determine at what rate it 
wished to be taxed for education and to spend the amount that is 
fixed by the state to correspond to the tax rate chosen. Each district 
would have to make an equal effort to get equal dollars. Family 
power equalizing operates on the same principle. The relevant unit 
would be the family, rather than the school district; and the family's 
choice would be reflected in a "tuition voucher" which the family 
100. Community control advocates also see community-run schools as a way of 
forcing the white establishment to take their demands seriously. Viewed in this way, the 
community school becomes a power base in a very traditional sense-a mode of politiciz-
ing the black community and a ready source of jobs and patronage. See N. GLAZER & 
D. MoYNllIAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT (1963), which describes similar political forays 
by other New York City minority groups. 
101. See, e.g., Coons, Clune, 8: Sugarman, Educational opportunity: A Workable 
Constitutional Test for State Financing Structures, 57 CAL. L. REv. 305 (1969); Michel-
man, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HAR.v. L. REv. 7 (1969). 
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could use to support any educational alternative, public or private, 
that it chose. 
Power equalizing schemes-or other alternatives such as educa-
tional parks102 or metropolitan school districts-are not necessarily 
preferable to community controlled schools. They may not even be 
inconsistent with some community control schemes. They are, none-
theless, alternatives. Community control presumes the existence of 
a functioning community of like-minded citizens. Family-power-
equalizing plans stress the importance of individual, not community, 
choice. To opt for one, and to give it constitutional status, cuts off 
alternatives prematurely without educational or legal warrant. For 
that reason, judicial intervention ought to be directed toward pre-
serving and promoting choices, rather than toward favoring any par-
ticular educational reform such as community control. 
A second line of constitutional argument focuses not on the 
quality of education that community controlled schools would as-
sertedly ensure, but on the community's political rights to govern 
its own schools. It challenges the practice of city-wide elections for 
school board members, asserting that that practice ensures the elec-
tion of an all middle-class board, thereby effectively disenfranchising 
the poor and black urban communities. In Owens v. School Com-
mittee of Boston103 that city's black community has brought suit in 
federal court, arguing that the city's practice of city-wide elections 
for all school board members acts to deny ghetto residents equal 
protection of the law, in that it affords the ghetto community no 
effective way of articulating its interests through the election proce-
dure. The Owens plaintiffs have requested district elections to the 
city-wide board and a decentralization of many educational func-
tions. Their argument is based on those cases which have noted that 
an otherwise acceptable election scheme would be unconstitutional 
if it "operated to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial 
or politicial elements of the voting population."104 Admittedly, the 
Supreme Court has never yet identified such a situation; its remarks 
are dicta only. In Chavis v. Whitcomb,1°5 however, a three-judge 
federal district court, sitting in the Southern District of Indiana, 
overturned a plan for electing members of the Indiana state legisla-
ture, because that plan included ghetto blacks in a large multimem-
102. Educational parks are district-wide educational centers which offer a wider 
range of services than any single school could afford. 
103. 304 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mass. 1969). 
104. Fortsen v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). See also Burns v. Richardson, 384 
U.S. 73 (1966); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967). 
105. 305 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Ind. 1969), prob. juris. noted, 397 U.S. 984 (1970). 
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ber district dominated by a middle-class white majority, thereby 
ignoring the cognizable interests of the ghetto community and deny-
ing it effective representation. 
Chavis and Owens are factually distinguishable. In Chavis, the 
ghetto was an unrepresented part of a larger multimember district, 
yet was as populous as other, single-member districts created by the 
same plan. In Boston, every school board member is elected on a 
city-wide basis.106 Indeed, the Boston arrangement might conceiv-
ably fit within the "uniform district principle" which the Chavis 
court instructed the Indiana legislature to "give considerable atten-
tion to."107 Yet this distinction does not foreclose the community 
control advocates' argument in Owens. Central both to the Chavis 
opinion and to the plaintiff's claim in Owens is a set of legal and 
political assumptions which signal a substantial shift in judicial think-
ing about representation and governance, and which afford unpre-
cedented legitimacy to the exercise of power by homogeneous 
groups. 
The root assumptions are that groups of individuals act in polit-
ical concert and that, moreover, they have a judicially protected 
right to do so. The court in Chavis undertook as its principal task 
the identification of "an injured minority group residing in a mod-
em 'ghetto.' "108 It devoted the largest part of its opinion to an 
examination of demographic, social, and political indicators which 
bear on that identification. Such inquiry is quite different from the 
Supreme Court's practice, in the reapportionment cases, of focusing 
on dilution of individual voting power, rather than on group in-
terests.100 The Court's practice, while avowedly politically neutral, 
in fact represents an emphasis on one among a variety of possible 
principles of political representation. As Justice Frankfurter argued 
in Baker v. Carr,11° attempting to steer the Court away from this 
"political thicket": 
One cannot speak of "debasement" or "dilution" of the value of the 
vote until there is first defined a standard of reference as to what a 
vote should be worth. What is actually asked of the Court ... is to 
106. Another possible distinction-that Chavis concerns legislative districts while 
Owens concerns school districts-has apparently been rejected by the Supreme Court. 
See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 393 U.S. 818 (1969). See also Avery v. Midland 
City, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Oliver v. Board of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
107. 305 F. Supp. at 1392. 
108. 305 F. Supp. at 1373. 
109. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1964). Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) does not recognize the possible effect of 
gerrymandering on racial groups. 
110. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
1382 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:1355 
choose among competing bases of representation-ultimately, really 
among competing theories of political philosophy.m 
The Chavis court would substitute the community for the individ-
ual, at least where the community is a "modern ghetto"-black, 
poor, and geographically isolated. It is clear, however, that the 
Chavis court would not accept any black community. The court re-
viewed income levels, housing standards, educational records, and 
political representation on a district-by-district basis; and it ulti-
mately excluded from the ghetto one relatively prosperous black 
district. Having completed that task, it presumed, without support-
ing argument, that the area that it had mapped out shared certain 
political concerns. It presumed further that those concerns could be 
adequately represented in the state legislature only by an elected 
representative of the ghetto. Thus, the court found that the ghetto 
had a constitutional right to identifiable representation, at least 
with respect to matters of state-wide concern, even though the state 
had granted it no formal and separate political existence. 
This set of presumptions relied on in Chavis is inconsistent with 
the notion of a uniform districting system, a notion that the court 
alluded to in several instances. If one accepts the court's reasoning, 
it is not just any uniformity of treatment-such as all single-member 
districts, all multimember districts, or an at-large election for the 
entire state-that will satisfy the constitutional requirements. Uni-
formity must give way to the interests of the ghetto. As the court 
itself noted, "the maximum size of the uniform districts should, of 
course, not be so large as to create the improper dilution of minority 
group voting strength found in the instant case."112 
The Chavis assumptions about the legitimacy of bloc representa-
tion lie at the heart of the Boston school districting suit and indeed 
are basic to the political philosophy inherent in decentralized schools. 
The proponents of decentralization argue that black and poor 
parents have identifiable common interests in the education of their 
children, that those interests are distinguishable from middle-class 
concerns, and that those interests require recognition in a school 
district managed by and for the community. That view is, of course, 
inconsistent with the conventional philosophy of American school-
ing-a philosophy which insists that the mission of the schools is to 
Americanize, to make all children equal by making them all the 
same, a philosophy which has sought since the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury to produce a common breed of men by socializing them in com-
111. 369 U.S. at 300 (dissenting opinion). 
112. 305 F. Supp. at 1392. 
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mon public schools. In part, the control argument embodies a 
recognition of the failure of that conventional view. It demands that 
the common-schooling ideal be seen not as the exclusive method to 
provide schooling, but merely as one alternative solution embodying 
-like the "one man-one vote" reapportionment standard-one par-
ticular set of political and social value choices. The community con-
trol supporters argue that since the universal and common approach 
has failed, it is necessary to adopt an approach which emphasizes the 
particular and the different. They would establish their own school 
district in the same way that Chavis created an electoral district. 
Such an argument puts the courts in an uncomfortable position. 
It suggests the limitations of the analysis that the Owens court in-
dulged in: 
The system of electing members of a governmental board in an at-
large election is, of course, a device quite commonly used. There are 
advantages and disadvantages to the use of either the at-large or the 
district system of election. One supposedly ensures the election of 
the type of official who can command a wide support throughout 
the whole community and will be representative of and responsive 
to the needs of the community as a whole. The other is designed to 
ensure representation of the particular interests of the separate 
geographical segments of the community, perhaps at the expense of 
the general interest.11s 
Yet, as Chavis demonstrates, the at-large system preserves the niceties 
of the individual vote but effectively diminishes the power of the 
minority group. If the interest of the group-or of certain otherwise 
powerless groups-demands recognition, the recitation of alterna-
tives is simply inadequate. 
The alternative judicial course rejected in Owens is, however, 
profoundly troubling. That course requires the acceptance of the 
Chavis rationale to elevate the single-member, community-based 
election district to constitutional status, the application of that 
principle to school board elections, and the extension of that doc-
trine to force decentralization. It binds the courts to a set of assump-
tions about group interests--and about the adequacy of group 
representation to secure those interests--that are rooted in assertion 
and ideology rather than in law. It commits the court to an almost 
constant search for a community entitled to a political recognition, 
even though a court is ill-equipped to make that search. It suggests 
that there is one set of standards for poor and black communities 
and another, thus far unarticulated, set for other sorts of commu-
lll!. !104 F. Supp. at 1!129. 
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nities. Moreover, it assumes that only through decentralization can 
group representation be achieved. By making that assumption, it 
preserves like-mindedness at the expense of heterogeneity and choice 
-attributes which, for schooling if not for electoral districts, are 
considered by some authorities to be virtues. The inadequacy of 
adjudication as a means of making this difficult set of decisions is 
likely to lead the courts not to insist on decentralization, but rather 
to defer to the body politic for guidance and political choice mak-
ing.114 
IV. CONCLUSION 
At this point in time, the most significant judicial foray into 
the realm of community control is the opinion of the federal dis-
trict court in Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Board of Education.ms 
That opinion provides little encouragement to those who would 
have the courts resolve this tangle of educational, legal, and polit-
ical questions. 
The series of occurrences that gave rise to the litigation in this 
case began in the early 1960's, when the Norwalk school board 
concluded that de facto segregation was both morally wrong and 
educationally damaging, and took steps to eliminate it. While the 
board's first thought was to bus children into and out of the black 
ghetto, its ultimate remedy was to put an end to de facto segregation 
by phasing out the town's ghetto schools and busing all of the black 
students out of the ghetto and into the white schools, while white 
children would continue to go to neighborhood schools.116 Initially, 
this plan received the approval of all segments of the community, but 
in 1968 as the last ghetto elementary school was about to be closed, 
the local chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) pro-
tested. When the school board ignored the protest, CORE sued 
the board, seeking to prevent it from closing the ghetto school.117 In 
114. This is not, of course, to suggest that the courts ought not inten·ene when 
legislative action betrays dear racial bias. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 
(1960). 
115. 298 F. Supp. 213 (D. Conn. 1969). 
116. The board relied on several factors to justify its decision not to bus white 
children into the ghetto schools. It took into account what it regarded as the bad 
reputation of the ghetto area, a factor which it felt would disquiet parents throughout 
the community. It felt that Norwalk schools could deal more readily with blacks' 
psychological adjustment to predominantly white schools than they could with white 
students' and parents' adjustments to what had been predominantly black schools. Most 
important, the board believed that it was not politically feasible to require white 
schoolchildren to attend the ghetto schools. 
117. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 298 F. Supp. 213 (D. Conn. 1969). 
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its suit, CORE called at first for the reopening of black neighbor-
hood schools, arguing on equal protection grounds that if whites 
were entitled to neighborhood schools, then blacks were entitled to 
their own schools as well. Subsequently, CORE modified the suit 
to insist upon cross-busing, arguing, again on equal protection 
grounds, that if black children were to be bused to white schools, 
then white children should be bused to black schools. 
The suit posed for the court the kinds of dilemmas that have 
already been discussed. How actively, for example, should the court 
review the decision of the school board? Should it defer to the 
wisdom of the board, which was exercising its statutory responsi-
bility for making policy, or should it reject the board's claim to 
expertise? What sort of evidence should the court consider in reach-
ing its decision? Should it rely on the central finding of the Coleman 
Report that "a pupil's achievement is strongly related to the edu-
cational backgrounds and aspirations of the other students in the 
school . . . . Children of a given family background when put in 
schools of different social composition, will achieve at quite different 
levels,"118 and thus conclude that social-class integration is necessary 
in order to secure equality of opportunity? Or is it appropriate for 
a court to seek out evidence designed to measure the sentiment of 
the affected community with respect to integration? If a court de-
termines that one community wants to manage its mvn schools, 
should that determination be conclusive? Which community's in-
terest should the court bear foremost in mind: that of the black 
neighborhood, that of the city community, or that of some broader 
community? The court did not deal with all of these questions. No 
evidence was introduced concerning the educational advantages of 
neighborhood schools or the disadvantages of busing. Thus, the 
court was not obliged to decide between integrated education and 
community controlled education. It considered only whether the 
manner in which the integration of policy was implemented unduly 
burdened the black community, and it ultimately approved the 
Norwalk busing scheme.119 
The court might have focused on the burden implicit in the 
fact that black children were one hundred times more likely to be 
bused to school than were white children. The court might then 
have required the school board to provide compelling justification 
118. U.S. NATL. CENTER FOR Eouc. STATISTICS, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTU-
NITY 22 a. Coleman ed. 1966). 
119. 775 of 1,581 Negro and Puerto Rican children in Nonvalk were bused in the 
1967-68 school year, while only 39 of 7,984 white children were bused. 298 F. Supp. at 
216. 
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for not adopting an approach that more equitably distributed the 
burden of being bused. But instead the court adopted a wavering 
legal standard. Although the opinion appears to subject the board's 
decision to "rigid scrutiny,"120 the standard that was ultimately-
and improperly-relied upon requires that the plaintiffs show "gov-
ernment action which without justification impose[d] unequal bur-
dens or award[ ed] unequal benefits . . . ."121 The explanation for 
this discrepancy lies in the court's characterization of the complaint 
as alleging neighborhood, rather than individual, discrimination. 
The court upheld the school board's plan because the board had 
justifiably distinguished between neighborhoods which were appro-
priate for schools and others-primarily the ghetto--which were 
inappropriate.122 • 
The opinion made it clear that individuals could not be treated 
so cavalierly: "It is fundamental that the rights of individuals in 
similar circumstances must be governed by the same rules. . . ."123 
Neighborhoods, however, were an altogether different matter: 
Although people are equal, and governmental classification by race 
will not be tolerated, neighborhoods are not. . . . While neighbor-
hoods theoretically remain equal, as a practical matter they do not 
remain equal and the law does not command that they be treated 
equally. . . . It is doubtful that residents of one neighborhood ap-
propriately may claim the benefits of circumstances similar to an-
other, where a neighborhood classification has been made.124 
Indeed, the court hinted that the school board may have had an 
obligation to distinguish between good and bad neighborhoods: 
"Had the board ignored this reality, it might well not have fulfilled 
its duty of providing the best education for all children of Nor-
walk. "125 The court's distinction between individuals and neighbor-
hoods is very troublesome. The plaintiffs in the case were not 
neighborhoods, but organizations representing individual citizens. 
The rights being asserted were those of individual schoolchildren 
who happened to live in a single neighborhood and who were 
treated differently from the children of other neighborhoods. Yet the 
court never faced the most vital constitutional issue: Can the hap-
penstance of residence justify differential treatment of individuals? 
120. 298 F. Supp. at 223. 
121. 298 F. Supp. at 225. 
122. In a sense, this decision is the converse of Chavis: it recognizes the existence of 
neighborhoods but denies their asserted common concerns. 
123. 298 F. Supp. at 222. 
124. 298 F. Supp. at 222-23 (emphasis deleted). 
125. 298 F. Supp. at 223. 
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Instead, it concluded "that there is a correlation between the less 
desirable (from the standpoint of location of schools) neighborhoods 
of Nonvalk and neighborhoods of predominantly black and Puerto 
Rican population. . ."126 and that this correlation justified the 
school board's decision to close schools in the black and Puerto 
Rican sections of Norwalk. 
If the court's legal reasoning poses problems, the tacit educa-
tional assumptions are almost indefensible. For instance, the court 
stated: "Just as one neighborhood may afford a more suitable loca-
tion for a factory, another may provide a more suitable environment 
for the location of a school."127 The opinion never suggests what 
that "more suitable environment" entails, although from the dis-
tinction that is drawn one might surmise that green grass, quiet, 
and an area inhabited by whites are primary attributes. Yet why 
should these be essential to successful schooling? Many communities 
have sought out factories for schooling sites, both because they pro-
vide big, cheap buildings and because they provide some tangible 
connection between school and community.128 These political and 
educational judgments are not matters in which the courts usually 
regard themselves as having competence, and the Norwalk court's 
foray into this area only affirms the wisdom of the usual judicial 
attitude. 
In one sense, the conclusion of this discussion is obvious. Com-
munity control is constitutionally permissible if the community has 
opted for such control and if dissenting members of the community 
may send their children out of the local district to integrated schools. 
Community control is not, however, constitutionally required. To 
give it or any promising educational alternative constitutional status 
would restrict choice without pedagogic or legal warrant. 
The discussion raises a second set of questions, concerning the 
role of the judiciary in resolving social issues. Perhaps the most note-
worthy feature of the segregation litigation has been its incapacity to 
bring about the changes that judicial decrees have mandated. The 
law requiring the disestablishment of dual-school systems is plain. 
But equally plain is the fact that in the 1968-69 school year, four-
teen years after Brown Il,129 less than one-fifth of all Southern black 
126. 298 F. Supp. at 222. 
127, 298 F. Supp. at 222. 
128. In Philadelphia, the Mantua Mini School and the Advancement School are both 
located in former factories. AGENDA FOR CHANGE (1969), a study recently completed by 
the Harvard Graduate School of Education, urges that Lowell, Massachusetts, convert an 
old mill into an educational resource center. 
129, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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schoolchildren attended even nominally integrated schools.130 In 
part, the explanation for this massive failure of implementation 
rests with the perseverance of the Southern white community in 
developing strategies to evade Brown. Yet a substantial part of the 
explanation lies with the failure of litigation as a device for bringing 
about social and political change. 
Litigation concerning social policy may be viewed as a means of 
benefitting a badly treated community, with only minimal involve-
ment of that community. This fact, which has seemed to be litiga-
tion's particular strength, now appears also to be a significant 
weakness. Courts can declare rights and obligations, but their capa-
city to enforce those declarations is far more limited. Enforcement 
depends primarily on the willingness of the beneficiary to lay claim 
to his newly gotten rights. The fact that "freedom-of-choice" plans 
served to perpetuate segregated schools in the South131 indicates the 
inability of the intended beneficiary-in that instance, the South-
ern black community-to assert its rights. Had blacks exercised their 
option and enrolled at the formerly all-white schools, the freedom-
of-choice plans could conceivably have led to integrated schools. In 
fact, however, the blacks remained with such consistency in the 
schools which they had previously attended that the Supreme Court 
was led to conclude that freedom-of-choice plans did not constitute 
a permissible method of disestablishing the dual school systems.132 
In would be inappropriate to fix blame for this incapacity to 
assert rights. Yet the lesson seems plain: the role of the courts in 
dealing with these questions will almost inevitably be a limited one. 
It has been suggested in this Article that the stated judicial concern 
with free association should be focused on preserving educational 
alternatives, such as community control, where those alternatives do 
not violate the constitutional command of equal educational op-
portunity. Beyond that, the questions remain ideological and polit-
ical. They will be resolved not by judicial decree, but rather by an 
assertion of community will on the part of those most directly and 
most adversely affected by the public schools. 
130. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1969, § 4, at I, cols. 5-6. 
131. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Goss v. Board of 
Educ., 373 U.S. 687 (1963). 
132. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
